Arab Cutlasses of the Pirate Coast

[Jim McDougall]

Fantastic entry gp!!!
Absolutely, the so called Sallee Rovers were the forerunners of the Barbary Pirates, though Im not sure if they melded into the Barbary category or not.
This is amazing artwork and adds so much to the context here.
These activities were prevalent along these coastal areas of North Africa and which seem often to have extended much further to other coasts.

It is interesting that European renegades often joined the ranks of these 'rovers' and that circumstance prevailed into the 'Barbary' period as well.

[gp]

Originally Posted by Jim McDougall

Fantastic entry gp!!!
Absolutely, the so called Sallee Rovers were the forerunners of the Barbary Pirates, though Im not sure if they melded into the Barbary category or not.
This is amazing artwork and adds so much to the context here.
These activities were prevalent along these coastal areas of North Africa and which seem often to have extended much further to other coasts.

It is interesting that European renegades often joined the ranks of these 'rovers' and that circumstance prevailed into the 'Barbary' period as well.

formally the Sallee pirates reported to the Ottoman Empire, but had some independence. This was more or less centrally controlled from Tunis and Algiers.
Later the Sallee pirates took on a special status. But many Dutch renegades were found in both places.


It is interesting to see that the Dutch VOC was a prominent arms dealer at that time. Along the entire coast you will see cannons in the kasbahs with the VOC sign and city name; From Tangier, via Sallee, Safi and El Jadidah (Mazagan)..
pics :
CUTLASS BARBARY PIRATE SHORT SWORD 1650
and a Barbary Corsar AD 1500-1800 Torquay Museum

and most interesting:
http://www.vikingsword.com/vb/showthread.php?t=6749

[Orang Lama]

On the topic of Italian influences on Indian Ocean pirates, what do you make of this one? The hilt is a typical example of the "Turk's head" type of mid-eighteenth century Genoan dagger, but the curved blade resembles that of a Moplah knife (Albeit, quite a small and delicate one.). At the same time, the pommel cap design reminds me of Zanzibari nimchas.

[Peter Hudson]

PIRACY IN INDIAN WATERS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
RUBY MALONI*

From https://www.jstor.org/stable/44142635?seq=2

During the seventeenth century piracy in Indian Ocean was common and in forms according to the social and political context. Within the compleat warp and weft of Asian maritime trade, this phenomenon has to be understood as a matter of shadings rather than clear distinctions. For a long time this has been de-emphasised or passed over lightly by most historians as tales of freebooters and buccaneers. But recently interest has been focussed on both separately and as part of the debate on the relations between the east Asian trade and European penetration in Asia in the pre-colonial phase.

The aim of this paper is to underline and examine some of the facets in the Western Indian Ocean, especially as it emerges from the evidence Surat Factory Records. Among the usual staid reports and placid narrative a refrain of piracy is discernible. Two significant aspects are to do with Malabar 'pirates', and Indian shipping at the port of Surat. Both were woven into the system of protection and coercion introduced into the waters by European maritime powers. Effort has been made in this paper to keep away from an Eurocentric paradigm as well as a drastic reaction to it.

Piracy has been called "an occupational disease of commerce." In this period and area, piratical operations manifested themselves variedly and widely. It was rife in the China seas, especially in the period of the Ming dynasty. The dreaded Wako pirates, based in Japan, operated freely along the Gulf of Siam and China's southern and eastern coastline. In the Arabian Sea, the Yarubi (Omani) Navy emerged as a powerful force. By 1650 Muscat held by Portugal fell to them and in the next fifteen years they swept the Portuguese out of all east African settlements except Mozambique. Bombay, Diu and Bassein were plundered by them.

Matters were further complicated by the incursion of European buccaneers who made Madagascar and the Comoro Islands their base and preyed on Indian shipping, their main intent was the plunder of specie and spices. While riverine Bengal faced the depredations of Portuguese freebooters along with the Maghs of Arakan, west coast shipping was harassed by the pirates of north-west Kathiawar. Many merchants were on the pirate fringe. European private merchants and 'Interlopers' were among those who indulged in piracy if the opportunity presented itself. This period witnessed the rise of new nuclei of naval power in western Indian waters, such as the respective navies of the Zamorin of Calicut, Angre and the Sidi of Janjira.]

The sixteenth century was a watershed between peaceful trading and armed trading in the Indian Ocean. The . Portuguese had the dubious distinction of introducing politics into the Ocean. From the very beginning the Portuguese discovery of the Cape route to India was accompanied by a determination to place coercive methods before those of normal peaceful commerce. Pedro Alvarez Cabral's instructions in 1500 were that if ships trading with Calicutwere encountered he would take possession of them, " of their merchandise and property and also of the Moors who are in the ships."

Every Indian ship had to buy a cartaz (Traders licence) if it was to avoid seizure and confiscation of its cargo. The revenue earned through this redistributive enterprise was substantial, and made the Estado da India a piratical state or in Braudels terms, simply customs officials'.

The violent overture of the Portuguese was taken up by the English and the Dutch, continuing the undisguised use of sea power and payment for
protection en route. In the seventeenth century, indigenous shipping in the Indian Ocean would be equipped in many instances with passes from several European nations. The Surat Factory Records contain clear references to the capture of Indian vessels without English passes, and the organisation of kafilas or convoys with an aim at control. By 1630 the English fleet at Surat was trying to protect Indian ships plying the Red Sea trade, such as the Shahi, after richly laden ships like the Musahi had been seized by the Portuguese. Forty years later, the English continued to escort Indian vessels in this area, particularly Aurangzeb's Mocha 'junks'.

Convoys were organised with a dual purpose: to protect against pirates, but more to ensure that the protected ships traded according to their conditions. Thus the cost of the pass was sheer unreciprocal extortion, first by the Portuguese, then the Dutch and the English. Protection and coercion were contradictory, yet two sides of the same coin. Both were exercised in ample measure, and the play of free trade and open competition vs domination and
operation of monopolies makes for a significant study.

Important implications lie in the forms of resistance offered against the passes, i.e. a monopolistic system. A challenge on a combative level emanated from the 'Malabaris', who were skilled and determined enough to avoid this control. This is the traditional maritime group mentioned most often in the Factory Records. Throughout the sixteenth century the Portuguese had treated ships from Calicut, which they called 'Malavares', as pirates and attacked them on sight. The Kunjalis were the 'corsairs' or corsario of the Portuguese records. The Malabaris ,were described by Careri as the most ferocious of pirates, consisting of men from 'nationalities' like "the Moors, Gentiles, Jews and Christians". Mostly they were undefined to their contemporary European observers and projected as a monolithic group. In functional terms some were pirates, some guerrilla warriors and many inoffensive traders.

Most of the Malabaris belonged to the seafaring merchant community of Moplahs. Heads of powerful Moplah families armed their own fleets; among them was Muhammad Marakkar who received the title of Kunjali from Zamorin. Becoming his naval auxiliaries, the Moplah Kunjalis clearly did take part in politics at sea. But documentation about them is insufficient. Their area of operations was centered at the northernmost part of Malabar, ruled by the Kolattiri Raja with his power base at Cannanore. From the kottakal river to Cranganore stretched the lands of Zamorin with his port at Calicut. The coastal creeks, lagoons and estuaries of these two domains harboured the Malabar 'pirates'. Porakkad, Ponnani, Kappatt, Pantalayini, Kollam and Chaliyam offered sites for clandestine activities. Malabar's main export was pepper, which the Portuguese wished to monopolise. The Moplahs had no choice but resistance, at which they were remarkably successful. Huge amounts of pepper were transported outside the Portuguese system by local traders. In Malabar and Cañara, in the first decade of the seventeenth century only about 1/10 of the total production went to Lisbon. Armed ships carried cargoes of pepper, cardamom and cinnamon to Gujarat, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the Maldive Islands and Sri Lanka and to the Coromandel - with or without cartazes. Rice was traded by sea, up and down the west coast of India. Surat had old ties with Mangalore, Calicut, Cannanore and other Malabar ports. In the mid-seventeenth century, it was the major exporting point for Malabar pepper to Mocha, Muscat and Basra.

The Malabar's naval strength showed an increased vigour in direct challenges to European naval power in the seventeenth century. In fact, some historians hold that the Portuguese were exhausted by the naval war waged against them. Sambuks and almadias sailed the length of the west coast, escorted by Malabar paraos. These were fast small galleys of approx. 60 tuns, manned on each side by 20-10 oarsmen; they could carry 3 or 4 pieces of artillery and more than 100 archers or arquebusiers. They were open decked and lateen rigged, with one or two masts. The Malabar sailors who were intrepid seaman could outmanoeuvre bigger vessels, their common mode of attack to throw 'fire pots' on the deck of the enemy ship.

To the English factors the Malabris continued to be a tangible threat and obstructive presence. This was seized as an excuse for condoning or even initiating seizure of Indian merchant vessels and freebooting on the high seas.

As an incentive to the freighted English ships for this kind of activity, the Company servants offered 1/6 of the loot to the commander and crew. President Matthew Andrewes implicitly instructed the commander of the American Frigate , "The Mallabars that you may encounter, we desire you if possible not to let escape, but to seize on the vessels, empty the goods, and then fire them, setting the men on shore the next land you can conveniently come at. For your so doing, 1/6th part is yours, and the ship's Company's share." Increasing European piracy in the Arabian Sea became a source of recurring conflict with the Mughal authorities, the most prominent example of which was the capture of Aurangzeb's ship Ganj-i Sawai by the English pirate Henry Every. It was commonly believed in Surat that the servants of the English factory had dealings with English pirates. The Emperor's retaliative measures against the English factors highlight a system of balance of threats.

In about 1650 the merchant navy of Surat contained 50 ships, large and well built. By 1701 the number of sea-going ships in Surat was at least 112. Much of the Indian shipping at Surat belonged to the aristocracy, the large princely ship declining in importance only in the later seventeenth century. In respect of freight traffic, the Mughals realizing the potential of the westward trade financed the building of ships. This reduced Indian dependence on foreign vessels but also made them vulnerable at sea and more reliant on European naval escorts. The number of vessels captured commensurately pushed up the coast of protection. However, this protection was not really adequate. Exasperated at the breakdown of protection on the pilgrimage route, Aurangzeb ordered Sir John Gayer, the 'old' Governor and his fellow servants to be thrown into prison, an episode taken advantage of by the 'new' Company's Governor Sir Nicholas Waite (1700-08).

At Masulipatam also, Aurangzeb's demand to Sir William Norris was to give Protection to Mughal shipping. Whenever a dispute broke out between one of the trading companies
and the Mughal authorities, the first step taken by the latter was to cut-off the supplies. The reply of the factors was to make prizes of Indian vessels. There were many instances of such a policy of brinkmanship. In so far as the European factories until they developed into fortified settlements- were at the mercy of the Mughal, there was a balance of threats.
In a discussion on piracy the driving forces behind certain questions have to be examined. European efforts at monopoly, increased piracy in Indian waters, as traders whom they dispossessed were forced to use this alternative. But only certain gProups like the Malabaris put forward resistance, and that too, in particular form, while others structured a modus vivendi of indirect partnerships with Europeans officials or merchants. Piracy was also a natural outgrowth of European rivalries. Ships of one nation waylaid another, even if they were not in a state of war, or had an official commission.

Piracy itself was an outcome of a vast improvement in naval and military techniques in the ships operating in the Indian Ocean.

Satish Chandra has argued that the corsairs could only succeed where their ships could outmanoeuvre or outgun an ordinary ship. In this context K.N. Chaudhuri's reference to " a clear naval Portuguese superio"ity over Asian ships" has to be re-examined. The Vasco da Gama period in Asian history, as Steensgaard names it, was not a uniform period of European naval superiority. Asian naval techniques and strategies were neither backward nor passive. Portuguese ships were not necessarily bigger than Asian; but they did carry cannon as a matter of course, while at first Asian ships did not. Also, big was not always better.

Peter Hudson.

[Peter Hudson]

Ottoman expansion and wars with the Portuguese now encouraged other Muslim Indian Ocean states to seek alliances with the Ottomans. The ruler of Ahmednagar in 1561 communicated a proposal for a joint campaign against the Portuguese stronghold of Chaul in India, and while the sultan of Aceh in Sumatra, Alauddin Riayat Syah (r. c. 1537–1571), also sent an embassy requesting Ottoman aid against the Portuguese in 1562, marking a break in the previous Acehnese policy of friendly relations with the Portuguese. This is the first Southeast Asian embassy that is recorded in the Ottoman sources, and would initiate a longstanding relationship between the Ottomans and the Acehnese—although one in which, as on this occasion, Acehnese hopes were usually to some degree disappointed. At this juncture, the Ottomans were trying again to negotiate a trade agreement with the Portuguese, which they did not wish to jeopardize; despite a more pacific Ottoman policy toward the Portuguese, ultimately the latter rejected the overtures. In the end the Acehnese were sent not the munitions they requested but ten cannon experts to assist the Acehnese in casting cannons. Ottoman cannons and cannonry enjoyed a great reputation throughout the Indian Ocean region. In addition, an Ottoman official, Lutfi, was dispatched to Aceh. Casale attributes a newly active interventionist policy in the Indian Ocean to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who was Grand Vizier between 1564 and 1579, but in fact, the dispatch of Lutfi suggests this probably preceded Sokolllu’s appointment, and may reflect Ottoman frustration that attempts to negotiate a trade deal with the Portuguese had yet again failed.

Lutfi returned to Istanbul in 1566, accompanied by an Acehnese ambassador, and bearing a document that is one of the most important and problematic Ottoman sources on the Indian Ocean in the 16th century. Written in Ottoman Turkish and addressed to Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566), this letter appears to be both a request for aid from the sultan of Aceh and a description of Lutfi’s own wanderings, as well as offering an outline of the current political situation in the Indian Ocean. It thus appears likely that Lutfi or another Ottoman official had a hand in composing it, while at the same time it almost certainly does to some degree represent the position of the Acehnese sultan, whom we know from other sources was seeking Ottoman aid at this time. The letter also claims that in the Maldives, Ceylon, and Calicut, the Ottoman sultan’s name was acknowledged in the khutba or sermon at prayers, a traditional symbol of the recognition of suzerainty, and asserts the willingness of the Acehnese sultan to do the same. The implications of this were both commercial and political. In the medieval Indian Ocean world, khutba networks bound together disparate mercantile communities, while the mentioning of the Ottoman sultan’s name could also signify recognition of Ottoman claims to be universal Caliphs. However, the letter goes further, and the Alauddin Riayat Syah purportedly asks to be considered not “an independent ruler . . . but in no way different from the governors of Egypt and Yemen, or the beys of Jiddah and Aden,” in return for the supply of munitions. The genuineness of this offer for the voluntary incorporation of Aceh into the Ottoman Empire has been met with some skepticism by scholars, who have suggested it may represent an elaboration by Lutfi, but in 19th-century Aceh, a memory of the sultanate as an Ottoman province or dependency still remained alive, suggesting it may have some basis.

The letter brought by Lutfi met an enthusiastic response in Istanbul, and Sokollu Mehmed Pasha authorized the equipping of a major naval expedition to Aceh; however, a major rebellion in Yemen in 1567 forced the expedition to be aborted to deal with the threat there. A much smaller Ottoman expeditionary force reached Aceh the following year, and continuing Ottoman interest in the Indian Ocean is suggested by the plan to build a Suez canal in 1568 to link the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, aimed in particular at facilitating the passage of the navy, although the canal was never actually built. A further expedition against Hormuz in 1570 was planned but never executed; similarly, in the 1570s, campaigns against Bahrain were considered but never undertaken. Meanwhile, the Portuguese attempted to disrupt Acehnese shipping heading for the Red Sea, but in the wake of the defeat at Lepanto in 1571 and the commencement of war with Iran in 1578, Ottoman activities in the Indian Ocean started to tail off. The last major expeditions were launched by the corsair Mir Ali Beg, who attacked Portuguese Muscat in 1581, and East Africa in 1586 and 1589, which seems to have aimed to remove the Portuguese from their strongholds there. Local Muslim rulers in Mogadishu and other East African towns pledged their allegiance to the Ottomans, but the final expedition ended in disaster at Mombasa, with Mir Ali’s capture by the Portuguese.

By this point, however, Ottoman–Portuguese rivalry was becoming irrelevant. Portugal itself was subsumed into the Hapsburg monarchy, and the Estado da Índia abandoned its attempts to enforce a monopoly, probably in response to the fact it was simply ineffective: it has been argued that the volume of Acehnese pepper reaching Jeddah by the end of the 16th century was greater than that taken by the Portuguese to Lisbon via the Cape. Furthermore, the age of Ottoman expansion was now at an end, with the Ottomans preoccupied with war with the Safavids (1578–1590), Austria (1593–1606), and widespread popular revolt in Anatolia. Much of the province of Habeş beyond the Red Sea littoral was lost to the Ethiopians in 1579, while Ottoman control of Yemen, always contested and fragile, was challenged by further revolts from 1597, resulting in the abandonment of the province in 1634. Thus by the end of the 16th century, the Ottomans were on the retreat in their two main Indian Ocean littoral provinces, and they abandoned Lahsa in eastern Arabia in the mid-17th century. Similarly, the Portuguese were kicked out of their foothold in the Middle East, the island of Hormuz, by the Safavids in 1622, and lost Muscat in 1650.

17th- and 18th-Century Connections
Ottoman involvement with the Indian Ocean world in the 17th and 18th centuries therefore has a very different character to that of the 16th century. Although occasional embassies with Mughal India were exchanged, there was very little diplomatic or military engagement with the broader region. Elsewhere, it was more the memory of earlier Ottoman involvement that proved enduringly influential. On the small sultanate of Faza in the Lamu archipelago off East Africa, a family named “al-Stambuli” (of Istanbul), claiming Turkish descent, seem to have seized power in the 16th century and remained in power until 1893. On the other side of the Indian Ocean, the Malay chronicle of the Acehnese ruler Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–1636) commemorates the visit of Ottoman ambassadors to Aceh, this seems to be a recollection of the 16th-century relationship rather than a reality. Nonetheless, Malay literature of the 17th century frequently recalls the Ottoman presence in the region, and various Malay rulers claimed descent from the Raja Rum, or Ottoman sultan.The prestige of Ottoman cannon and their associated cannon founders also played a great role in the Malay admiration for things Ottoman. This cultural influence continued to be one way in which the Ottomans continued to exert influence, as were commercial and religious links, which if anything seem to have grown stronger during this period, as far as our admittedly scanty evidence can tell us.

There is also evidence for a diaspora of Ottoman subjects across the Indian Ocean world, comprising military experts (especially cannon founders), merchants, and religious scholars. Some of this can be traced to earlier times: by the early 16th century, as noted above, Ottoman subjects played a major role in the Gujarati military, as well as elsewhere in India. In the 16th century, Ottoman military experts are attested in Aceh as well as Siam and Burma, where they were employed as mercenaries. This process of hiring Ottoman mercenaries continued irrespective of the lack of official Ottoman engagement at a state level, and in the late 17th century, we have an Ottoman subject, from Bursa, who is attested as governor of Bangkok, as well as a governor in Java who is described as “Turkish.” Ottoman merchants continued to play an important role in trade with Southeast Asia and India, and merchants from Constantinople are mentioned as far away as Banten in Java at the beginning of the 17th century, as well as in major emporia such as Aceh and Arakan. Dutch records from the early 17th century reveal a continuing import of a wide range of spices and luxuries via the Red Sea into the Ottoman lands. The Ottomans exported carpets, horses, and of course military equipment. One merchant at the end of the 17th century who is unusually well attested gives us a sense of the wide reach of commercial interests individuals could command: an Ottoman subject of Armenian descent from Aleppo, he made his fortune importing goods from the Red Sea into Ethiopia and sought to branch out into trade with Java, in which context there are copious records of him in the Dutch East India Company (VOC) archives.

Scholars from the Ottoman lands play a part in spreading Islam in the region. In Aceh, a certain Dawud al-Rumi, probably a descendant of one of the Ottoman soldiers, was an important figure in the development of Sufism. This religious connection was to prove particularly important, as from the 17th century onward increasing numbers of Southeast Asian scholars studied in Mecca and Medina; although there doubtless were earlier ones, they are poorly attested, whereas the 17th-century scholars who studied in Ottoman Hijaz and occasionally even traveled to Istanbul comprise some of the most important names in Southeast Asian ulama, such as Yusuf al-Makassari and ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Singkili. Particularly important was their relationship with the Medina-based Kurdish scholar and Sufi Ibrahim al-Kurani (1616–1690), who wrote an Arabic tract at the behest of his “Jawi” students to explain his interpretation of the influential ideas of the 13th-century Sufi Ibn ‘Arabi. In the 19th century, scholars from Patani on the Malay peninsula and Banten comprised particularly important elements of the “Jawi” diaspora in the Hijaz. While scholars from other parts of the Indian Ocean world of course also traveled to the holy cities and studied there, they do not seem to have had such a transformative influence as the Jawi migrants did on Southeast Asian Islam.

The Ottomans are largely absent from the 18th-century Indian Ocean, at least according to our current state of research. Yet they still featured on the political landscape, both as leaders of the umma and through the activities of the diaspora. As late as the 1750s, a sultan in the Philippines attempted to contact Istanbul seeking aid against the Spanish, while Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore in South India, dispatched an embassy to Constantinople in 1785. An Ottoman subject, Seh Ibrahim, purporting to be acting on the authority of the Ottoman sultan, played an important role in negotiations between the VOC and the Javanese sultan Mangkubumi in the 1750s, while the Javanese prince Dipanagara (1785–1855) adopted an Ottoman-style title and reorganized his army along Ottoman lines.

The Ottoman Sword most likely to have similar aspects as the Zanzibari Nimcha is as below The Pallash. The Hilt is very similar and has quillons almost the same etc etc... The Ottomans were there in the Indian Ocean from the 16th C and the design flow could easily have followed that situation. The paragraphs above clearly show Ottoman equipment including Cannons being supplied to neighbouring countries by sea routes well established in that period. Copying what was a shipbourne sword style would be a very plausible step. See the picture on my next post please.
....
Peter Hudson

[Peter Hudson]

Likely contender as a copied hilt for the Zanzibari Nimcha...

[Peter Hudson]

Forum Library shows that we had a beam of light shining on this subject about 10 years ago ..

Please see http://vikingsword.com/vb/showthread.php?t=17160

Note also at this reference the excellent anc clear detail of what I have noted is part of the Royal Signature or TUGHRA hammered into the Quillon ends on sword examples in that thread. It also contains the fine picture of the Ivory comb with gold inlay typical on some Zanzibar Nimcha examples etc etc
Peter Hudson.

[fernando]

Originally Posted by Peter Hudson

... PIRACY IN INDIAN WATERS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY RUBY MALONI*
... Satish Chandra has argued that the corsairs could only succeed where their ships could outmanoeuvre or outgun an ordinary ship. In this context K.N. Chaudhuri's reference to " a clear naval Portuguese superiority over Asian ships" has to be re-examined. The Vasco da Gama period in Asian history, as Steensgaard names it, was not a uniform period of European naval superiority. Asian naval techniques and strategies were neither backward nor passive. Portuguese ships were not necessarily bigger than Asian; but they did carry cannon as a matter of course, while at first Asian ships did not...

I wonder whether these two 'book size' posts (#29 & #30) are necessarily the full contents of the link provided above in the first place. If i may (also) change course from the Pirate Cutlass topic, i would elect a couple paragraphs that, in my humble perspective, are put by the authors in a rather (intentional ?) simplistic manner.

"Satish Chandra has argued that the corsairs could only succeed where their ships could outmanoeuvre or outgun an ordinary ship."
Not necessarily so. One screaming example is the battle of Ormuz in 1507.


"In this context K.N. Chaudhuri's reference to "a clear naval Portuguese superiority over Asian ships" has to be re-examined. The Vasco da Gama period in Asian history, as Steensgaard names it, was not a uniform period of European naval superiority."
The Vasco da Gama period took place in the early 1500's, not in the 17th century. But so were Cabral and Albuquerque and a few others, with similar level of achievements and evident superiority; and cruelty... let's admit it.

"Asian naval techniques and strategies were neither backward nor passive. Portuguese ships were not necessarily bigger than Asian; but they did carry cannon as a matter of course, while at first Asian ships did not.
Not so simply as just Cannon; but implying quality (bronze versus iron; breech loading) quantity ... and the best way to use them; composite ammo, further reach, ricochet waterline shot.

Nowithstanding all this glory only lasted for a couple centuries !!!.

[Peter Hudson]

https://uk.video.search.yahoo.com/yh...1&action=click


Many thanks for your input on the Indian Ocean and the part played by Portugal. When comparing the trade situation I think it fair that Portuguese methodology differed some what from that of Ottoman since Portugal used Armed Trader techniques and Ottoman trade was conducted with less firepower and more diplomacy...
And there are Island nations in the Indian Ocean that did request to purchase Ottoman Cannons etc.

Video style educational techniques have developed a long way in the last two decades... The above reference is an excellent and vey quick way to bring up the facts in a clever graphic technique I would reccommend to members.

The fact that the Ottomans spoke arabic must surely have placed them at an advantage and the fact that they didnt force local ships traders to purchase Trade Licences may be taken into account.

I base the main difference on the spoken arabic ...trader language at the forefront of why Ottoman designs would be likely to have been the order of the day...not Portuguese.

Excessive levels of cruelty may have been a disadvantage as weilded by Portuguese against local inhabitants is well documented but I have not described that here.

From my viewpoint it, the Jstor documant, shines a light on a subject I knew so little about but emphasises one very important factor for which I thank the Jstor article in my previous reference ...That of the vital Cultural reason behind trade in The Indian Ocean ..That of the Lingua Franka of the spoken arabic language common right across the region

. It was this common trading lingo which formed the framework for friendly trade relations and one which I believe strongly influenced design flow in weapons ...In this case from the PALLASCH of the Ottomans to the various NIMCHA described in the Buttin Charts.

A note here to quickly frame the influence on North African coastal and Morroccan Nimcha developed separately since the Meditteranean was really only on the Ottoman doorstep compared to the massive distances around the Indian Ocean and its tributaries of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf...not to mention the Bay of Bengal and all stations onward almost to China...

But again I need to emphasise the Jstor document as illustrating the CULTURAL reason of the spoken arabic as vital to understanding the growth in Trade and thus the acceptance of weapon design and is why we see PALLASCH HILT form above at post 31...and on arabian nimchas....shown on Buttins charts etc.

In observing the added net effect of the spread of Islam across the Indian Ocean and beyond plus the pilgrim routes too and from Mecca also spread similar forms of design flow and very similar designs in Dress, Jewellery, Food style, Houses, Mosques and Fortress style, Ship design, Poetry, Song and Dance, and now underpinned by these disclosures similarity in weapons design.

Peter Hudson.

[fernando]

So it seems as 'lingua franca' had its variants ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lingua_franca
"Portuguese served as lingua franca in the Portuguese Empire, Africa, South America and Asia in the 15th and 16th centuries. When the Portuguese started exploring the seas of Africa, America, Asia and Oceania, they tried to communicate with the natives by mixing a Portuguese-influenced version of lingua franca with the local languages. When Dutch, English or French ships came to compete with the Portuguese, the crews tried to learn this "broken Portuguese". Through a process of change the lingua franca and Portuguese lexicon was replaced with the languages of the people in contact."

[Jim McDougall]

Interesting discourse guys, thank you!
In beginning this thread my objective was to discuss some swords (cutlasses as it were) which I thought were aligned with the so called 'pirate coast' situated on eastern littoral of Arabia. What evolved has become even more fascinating and comprehensive thanks to the great entries here.

Actually, not surprisingly, it turned out these examples were actually from regions in Yemen and from familiar types there, with the expanse of Yemen and its profound external contacts experiencing a spectrum of variations in the swords present.

This revealed that Yemen was but one center in the vast sphere of sword forms, from those distinctly recognized and via the keen desperation of many collectors, and often scholars, to inclusion in the typically jargon oriented glossaries of what have become known loosely as 'collectors terms'.

The intriguing discourse here exploring the evolution of these vast spheres of colonization, indeed much of which was pioneered by Portugal in the 'Age of Discovery' in the 14th century, offers an interesting comparison.

Much in the way the necessary development of the 'lingua francia' concept, which in not confined to one particular pairing or amalgam of languages, the diffusion of weapon forms traveled through cultural spheres profusely.

By analogy, the styles and elements of hilt forms evolving throughout the vast cultural spheres and colonized regions becomes comparable to the diffusion of languages, and of course the evolution of 'lingua francia' language forms, which evolved into a sort of amalgam the prime languages. In comparison to the evolution of words in the lingua francia becoming a commonly recognized language, the styles and elements of swords from other cultural spheres prevalent in a region, became incorporated into locally favored styles.


With the complexity of the vast trade systems, and the confounding networking within presents the equally vast conundrum of trying to classify these various sword forms and their variants. While we try to use the blades in identification, despite being able to distinguish them typically through their character, markings etc. these were so widely traded as a commodity. In addition, blades were commonly replaced through the working lives of swords, which kept them circulating through many generations in many cases.

While there has been through the years, an understandable relative futility in trying to accurately classify these forms and their variants, I am glad to have the shared expertise and knowledge clearly exchanged here bringing these plausibilities and well supported observations into a comprehensive look at these conundrums.

Expansion is a good thing, as it is of course growth, and rather than deviation I see the growth of this thread in these expanded angles of observation toward the knowledge needed to better understand the diffusion of these sword forms.

[Peter Hudson]

Hello Fernando,
Thanks for your post. Yes I have seen your reference which also states the case for spoken Arabic. Quote"Arabic was used as a lingua franca across the Islamic empires, whose sizes necessitated the need for a common language, and spread across the Arab and Muslim worlds" Unquote.

In dealing with the peculiarities of two essentially regional designs of Nimcha i.e. The Moroccan and The Zanzibari; The common denominator is The Ottoman Empire and driven by the linguistic situation in both Regions meaning The Indian Ocean and its surroundings and The Meditteranean. It can be seen that Arabic was the lead Language ...in its spoken form...The primary Lingua Franka. Thus it was a CULTURAL situation.

It may be seen that in this case where a ship bourne sword was required and that applies in both Moroccan and Zanzibari requirements...that a tried and tested Cutlass type of sword would be ideal for ship defence and boarding party attacks ...

I use the term Form follows Fashion in the same way that court swords in Europe became shorter since they were often carried at Court and worn under the Court Dress Jacket....and these Jackets became shorter so the swords did the same...Thus it can be envisaged that the Nimcha swords of both regions followed many quirks and foibles specific to the regions it entered...

The most extraordinary variant is probably the Zanzibari Nimcha...which somehow sports a Turtle atop its Pommel, An odd squigle on the quillons similar to the Tughra of the 19thC ruler, Circular Sworls on the Scabbard Leather ...Weird gold over Ivory decoration on some VIP swords but overall a fascinating resemblance to a horses head grip and Pommeland almost exactly the same look as the Ottoman Pallasch hilt.

I insert here a note about the Knuckle Guards... since the squared Moroccan hilt was designed to ride up high on the chest almost under the left armpit which neccessitated a squared off knuckleguard as a rounded form wouldn't work but the squared off item did as it fitted flat against the ribcage...A rounded Knuckle Guard tends to make the weapon roll.....In the Zanzibar variant the sword was worn formally on the belt and simply followed the same form as the Pallasch in that respect. The blades were changed probably since the Ottoman item was very expensive looking at the Islamic inlay and lighter cheaper blades were available from German sources for Morocco and Hadramaut or Indian sources for Zanzibar.

Conclusion. Based on the similarities on the hilt of the Ottoman Pallasch and using the features outlined by Buttin in his quite detailed charts and from the history of the Ottoman Navy in the Indian Ocean and backed up in our own Forum Library my view is that the Pallasch is the prime suspect in the design flow across both regions in the case of both the Arabian and African variants...and seek the support from Forum to make that assessment.


Peter Hudson