2nd September 2015, 07:30 PM | #1 |
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Join Date: Mar 2011
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Wilkinson Sword Company Kukri (WSC 51)
Wilkinson Sword Company Kukri (WSC 51) Below is some basic information about the Wilkinson Kukri, which I have been researching in depth for some time. There will be further information coming in the new year, as some breakthroughs have been made, which I am currently in the process of collating. My thanks go to Robert Wilkinson Latham for allowing me free access to important historical documents, and for his kind assistance with my many questions. The initial design process began sometime during mid 1949, with the final design being sealed on 12th October 1950. During this time, Jack Wilkinson Latham, the then Managing Director of Wilkinson’s, questioned some of the specifications given by the war office. Chief amongst these were the strict inspection tolerances concerning the Kaudi. Upon further enquiry, it was ascertained that it was the Chief Inspector of Ordinances opinion that the kaudi was used as a sight, so that the kukri may be thrown with accuracy, and should therefore be produced to the same tolerances as a rifle sight! Needless to say, after a short discourse on the history and construction of the kukri, the ordinance relented, and the blade and kaudi were allowed the same tolerances. Officially designated MK IV/MK4. These names appear on the official Wilkinson Sword productions drawings. Interestingly both the terms “Kookrie” and “Kukri” are used on the Wilkinson Sword Documents, the documents being updated in 1968 with a Nato stock code (1095-99-962-0535) The MkVI was also referred to as “Kit kookrie MK1” in official correspondence with the Inspector of Armaments during 1969 , but this refers to the kukri, scabbard, frog, karda and chakmak as a unit. It is estimated that 1402 were finally produced by Wilkinson’s. This is an unusually small amount for a military production run, Less than 10% of serving gurkhas at the time would have been issued with them. This lends credence to the theory that the WSC order was an experiment in logistics, quality and costs. |
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